+

Smoke and Mirrors Is Opinion, Not Investigative Journalism

This is about an article in a series called “Smoke and Mirrors,” created by Christopher Osher under the editorship of Chris Reen at The Denver Gazette.

THE CONTEXT

The story didn’t exactly fall into their laps; they were specifically seeking out targets in the marijuana industry to take it all down.

The Colorado Springs Gazette, once a newspaper company devoted to journalism and social good, was sold. The new business lives under The Anschutz Corporation after being purchased by Colorado billionaire and active-Republican donor Phil Anschutz. Anschutz kept the old name and font as if nothing had changed, and boasts of being a Pulitzer Prize winner, the newspaper’s main claim to authority, front and center on the home page. Anschutz inherited an experienced investigative reporter, David Philipps, whose military reporting had already earned Pulitzer recognition. Around a year after Anschutz gained control, Philipps did it again and then left the company. That was over 12 years ago. The company has never been considered for a Pulitzer again.

From The Colorado Springs Gazette, the politically driven Denver-based business group recently spun out The Denver Gazette (2020), where this series of anti-marijuana writings, “Smoke and Mirrors,” lives. The conservative purpose of the Denver Gazette is openly declared: editor Vince Bzdek said that “one of the reasons we started the Denver Gazette” was to supply opinions and editorials “from the right side.”

Bzdek provided detail about Phil Anschutz’s satisfaction from involvement in the editorial operation. Phil Anschutz’s son, Christian Anschutz, is also directly involved; he sits on the Gazette’s editorial board.

Chris Reen, who is in charge of editing for “Smoke and Mirrors,” is both CEO and President of Clarity Media Group, Anschutz’s publishing business, which owns and controls the two Gazettes.

Reen came to work for Anschutz in 2011 when the billionaire finally bought the long-sought-after Broadmoor hotel from the Gaylord family, on the condition that Anschutz also acquire their other businesses, including The Oklahoman, where Reen, a career professional in advertising, marketing, and sales, had become publisher. Anschutz sold the unwanted Oklahoma newspaper but kept Reen, who would go on to become publisher of the Colorado Springs Gazette.

Now, as President and CEO of the Clarity Media Group, Reen represents Phil Anschutz’s business interests while also exercising direct oversight of the editors at both Gazettes. Just recently this summer, to the surprise of reporters around Colorado, Reen announced executive editor Vince Bzdek was effectively out, and Reen took over all editorial authority over The Denver Gazette and The Colorado Springs Gazette, calling on all editors at the Gazettes to report directly to him.

Reen’s Anschutz Corporation responsibilities also include his duties as CEO of MediaDC, which publishes The Washington Examiner. The Washington Examiner, based in D.C., publishes news daily online and has a weekly print magazine. I counted 92 people on its current public staff roster.

Reen also manages grants for The Anschutz Foundation, while also chairing its board, regardless of any conflict of interest that could occur between writing a story or not writing a story about a special donor or politician who Anschutz supports or who supports his foundation, which isn’t a trustworthy position to be in for a legitimate news company.

Reporters in Colorado have documented journalistic breaches from this group at the Gazettes for years. To name but a few: (1) gutting an investigation into Republican Senate candidate Robert Blaha shortly before an election, according to reporter Megan Schrader; (2) ordering Schrader to delete a tweet containing information removed from that story; (3) substantially altering her reporting about the financing of the Gaylord Rockies hotel after what she said she was told was an Anschutz directive; (4) killing a completed story involving a threatened lawsuit by the Anschutz-owned Broadmoor, according to reporter Ryan Maye Handy; (5) a former reporter’s account of a newsroom “shadow rule” discouraging investigations of Anschutz and his businesses; (6) closer scrutiny of progressively framed stories at Colorado Politics, according to former managing editor Linda Shapley; (7) a prospective employee’s account of being told that the owner wanted editorial content to “lean conservative”; and (8) repeated coverage of the Common Sense Institute without disclosing financial support from Anschutz family foundations or Christian Anschutz’s overlapping foundation and Gazette editorial-board roles.

Chris Reen denies that Phil Anschutz participates in news operations. Those denials now sit beside specific, on-the-record accounts above from reporters, as well as Bzdek, who, as also noted above, spoke about how and why Phil Anschutz involves himself directly in the operations. Current and former reporters and editors of the Gazette have described stories being weakened, suppressed, selectively scrutinized, and published without material disclosures. In addition to Bzdek’s account of Anschutz’s involvement directly, the stories from the reports above about Monica Mendoza’s account are especially specific: she said past editor Wayne Laugesen showed her emails from Anschutz directing editorial positions.

This new series, “Smoke and Mirrors,” under the same group, appears to fall right in line with the anti-marijuana series from the their “Clearing the Haze” project, which has been retracted or removed (Internet Archive Links). Corey Hutchins, who writes a weekly behind-the-scenes newsletter to promote the Colorado news industry, someone who appears more forgiving of journalists breaching code than anyone I’ve ever encountered in modern-day culture, wrote in CJR that “Clearing the Haze” looked more like “Blowing Smoke,” noting that it was written by two editorial-board members and a freelance legalization opponent, and that the Gazette failed to properly identify their authorities as opponents of legalization. Hutchins called it a “throw-everything-at-the-wall-and-see-what-sticks approach” to proving legalization harmful. The prior publisher, Dan Steever, acknowledged that the writers had a perspective and felt no obligation to include evidence or sources that might “counter or complicate” it. The printed installments lacked bylines, disclosures appeared inconsistently, and a Gazette reporter described the presentation as suffering from a “lack of transparency.” Staff members said they were “strongly discouraged” from criticizing the series in private or in public and warned that public criticism could jeopardize their jobs. Colorado Public Radio subsequently reported that current and former Gazette reporters believed the project, “Clearing the Haze,” should have been labeled opinion. I argue below that same designation must be made here. Further, it must be retracted because of its apparent disregard for the truth.

“Smoke and Mirrors” comes from the same institution, pursues the same anti-marijuana theme, and uses the same machinery, but appears to be exponentially more deceptive.

An important factor that distinguishes “Smoke and Mirrors” from “Clearing the Haze” is that the new “Smoke and Mirrors” series is written by Christopher Osher.

That gets right to the focus of my highest-level interest with this article, as it relates to my endeavor for an improved information society where truth and the historical record can be more assured, as I have been afflicted by this very root problem myself.

As I’ve pointed out in a spreadsheet in my Colorado Consumer Protection Act complaint against Alden Global Capital for deceptive business practices (Case No. 2025cv11), the writer of this new series, “Smoke and Mirrors,” Chris Osher, created a series at the Denver Post using the near-exact deceptive techniques, also calling it “Investigative Journalism” (which is one of the highest forms of journalistic authority to the truth in society) and in that case charged his way through a massive mistake generating over 120 errors, breaking Denver Post’s ethical promises and rules, and breaking over 30 of the 35 proposed rules comprising the entire body of the SPJ Code of Ethics. I’ve even documented how he uses himself as his own anonymous source. It’s not journalism; it’s some other form of media using the authority of investigative journalism fraudulently.

So what form of media is it then? I explicate and argue below that Osher uses patterned deceptive techniques which classify his writing style as “prosecutorial media” by deception and false light. Due to the level of deception in the writing style, it’s “prosecutorial media,” but not “prosecutorial journalism,” because false light and deception betray truthfulness.

Regardless of the facts, the purpose of Osher’s content, I contend, is not to use journalism to attack with the truth for justice, but to attack regardless of the truth to leave a political impression. To disguise it as truth under the guise of the tools of the trade of true investigative journalism is shameless.

Osher is a master of false light, a technique known in the courts by its name because it is false, and here in Colorado, Osher is safe to practice false light because Colorado does not recognize the tort.

Osher places individually accurate statements side by side to steer readers toward a causal conclusion the evidence does not establish. Later qualifications may undermine that conclusion, but when subtly introduced in another context, they leave the original, misleading impression intact.

The critique below of Osher’s work as it applies to this particular series does not rely on any of the information I’ve addressed so far. The above is meant to provide context to ease you into understanding that, just because Chris Osher’s work looks like legitimate journalism, you’ll need to be on your toes because it is not.

The victim in the story is named Jenifer and her husband is Luke. For agentic and search engine reasons, I have removed their last names in all text. You can find their full names if you need from the text in the original story. I empathize with their pain and have no doubt about what they have gone through. Allow me to be harsh when discussing their situation, a skepticism directed at Osher for what I believe is professional misconduct.

THE STORY

Osher uses his typical narrative: introduce an impression of failure by a person or entity he’s prosecuting, introduce the victim, then make the causal connection that no one else has made before. From there, pathos takes over, leading the audience through the story like a movie scene until sympathy for his victim archetype is locked in and the connection to the villain is validated by innuendo.

The story thus begins from the start framing the problem:

In March 2022, Colorado public health officials started getting startling reports of liver damage tied to a new marijuana-based sleep aid that had quickly become a top seller in the state.

But it wasn’t until June 2023, nearly 15 months later, that the state’s Marijuana Enforcement Division would warn consumers that the danger had become so serious that the manufacturer had halted production of the sleep pills, called 1906 Midnight Drops, after more reports of “acute liver injury.”

The delay highlights a slew of weaknesses in the system for protecting consumers from hazardous products in the nation’s first regulated recreational marijuana market.

The health complaints had prompted the division to investigate, but the agency decided it didn’t have the power to pull the drops from the stores in this situation.

Let’s recap what we now know must be true, according to the writing so far, namely that it took a delay of 15 months for the Marijuana Enforcement Division to issue a public notice:

1. Start Date: “In March 2022, Colorado public health officials started getting startling reports of liver damage”

2. Public Notice Date: “But it wasn’t until June 2023, nearly 15 months later, that the state’s Marijuana Enforcement Division would warn consumers.”

3. During the 15-month time frame: “The health complaints had prompted the division to investigate, but the agency decided it didn’t have the power to pull the drops from the stores in this situation.”

Therefore, the reader must come to the following conclusion as to the truth:

The Marijuana Enforcement Division (MED) took 15 months from the time they first learned about a possible danger until the time they issued a notice. This is the premise of this story.

Recall the title, now a step closer with clarity based on the claims that the MED regulators took too long: “Regulators Knew This Marijuana Product Was Harming People, It Stayed on Shelves for More Than a Year.”

The article continues where we left off:

If the agency had dug deeper, it might have found what the state attorney general’s office later discovered: The manufacturer, Sima Sciences, began receiving complaints of harm shortly after it launched 1906 Midnight Drops and two years before health officials ever did.

Instead, the enforcement division took four months after the first report of liver damage to the state to post a notice on its website.

Wait a minute, what? First it was a fifteen-month delay, matter-of-factly as we just proved above; now it’s suddenly reduced to four months? How did that happen?

Welcome to the world of deception of Chris Osher.

I dare you to stop here and re-read the passages above and try to figure out how the delay went from 15 months down to 4 months; you won’t be able to. I have not omitted any part of the story so far; you have read everything from the beginning. Before spoiling the mystery for you, let’s carry on with the rest of the introduction for the article and see what you can gather. It continues:

But the agency didn’t call it a health and safety warning, which would have advised people not to consume the product. It released a more neutrally named “informational notification.” While there had been reports of “adverse health events,” the notice said, regulators didn’t find any violations. The manufacturer had reformulated the product, the notice added, and no additional issues had surfaced.

Jenifer didn’t even see it.

Enter Osher’s victim, Jenifer, who is, for the purpose of this story, as you can see from the photo and caption, and what we have read so far, a victim of the MED regulators for taking 15 or 4 months to get out a notice. The article’s dramatic transition, “Jenifer didn’t even see it,” suggests that seeing the notice, which “would have advised people not to consume the product,” would have caused her to stop taking the product.

Let’s recap then with what we know now as to the truth, according to Osher:

1. Start Date: “In March 2022, Colorado public health officials started getting startling reports of liver damage”

2. Public Notice Date Disputed: “it wasn’t until June 2023, nearly 15 months later” that the MED informed the public, or “the enforcement division took four months after the first report of liver damage” to inform the public.

3. During the 15- or 4-month time frame: “the agency decided it didn’t have the power to pull the drops from the stores.”

4. Notice Label: Victim didn’t see the notice when it came out because of the label type: “But the agency didn’t call it a health and safety warning, which would have advised people not to consume the product. It released a more neutrally named ‘informational notification.’”

So to conclude, the agency failed in a second way, according to Osher, by not only getting the notice out late, but also by labeling the information they had as an “informational notification” instead of the more potent “health and safety warning” category when they did finally issue the notice, and thus Jenifer didn’t see it.

I hope you are sitting down. Have a look at our new fact about the notice label: the victim didn’t see the notice when it came out because of the label; Osher wrote: “But the agency didn’t call it a health and safety warning, which would have advised people not to consume the product.”

If you have a look at the actual notice itself, however, which obviously readers are not going to do as it certainly wasn’t provided (here is the actual MED notice), it indicates that the pills were deemed safe, not dangerous. I’m not kidding. The notice states that the company which made the Midnight Drops had stopped manufacturing the pills with Corydalis, which was the source of the harm in this case, and had replaced Corydalis with another ingredient. No one had reported any adverse reactions. Therefore, had Jenifer actually seen the notice, it would have given her confidence that the pills she was taking were safe. Osher never addresses this problem in the story.

So it’s unexplainable what Osher is doing here in trying to convince the audience that the notice would have saved her had she seen it, and that the notice should have warned people to stop taking it. I mean, it may be unexplainable to you, but I’ve spent two weeks working at uncovering all the deception in this story to explain what is going on. The fact is, nothing is going on. These are the elements of the facts he had on the table to work woth, and he wanted you to think that had she seen the notice, it would have saved her; that’s all. The data doesn’t hold up in this story and Osher is trying to make his way through anyway, and it’s not working.

Let’s read the rest of the introduction, which gets crazier considering where we are now.

Jenifer didn’t even see it.

A surgical assistant at an oral surgeon’s office, Jenifer wanted a safe, natural alternative to pharmaceuticals to treat her insomnia. So she was relieved when a local marijuana dispensary suggested a sugar-free option made of cannabis and herbal extracts that the manufacturer touted as the “the best sleep aid on the market.” She began taking the Midnight Drops nightly the same month that the state health department received its first complaint.

Unaware of the enforcement division’s notification, she didn’t worry when she started having full-body cramps and became lactose intolerant in September 2022, about six months after she started taking the drops. She thought she just needed to drink more water.

She continued taking the drops for nine more months until her dispensary stopped stocking them. Now, despite never having liver problems before, according to her medical records, she has liver damage at age 53; her doctor says she will ultimately need a transplant.

I hope you are still sitting down because now that we are at the end of the intro, we have a lot of work to do. Did you catch that there are new dates available to start piecing this puzzle together but that you are going to need to cross-reference, triangulate and get out your calendar and calculator to figure it all out? Go ahead and try; you still won’t be able to figure out what is going on with what’s been written so far.

Never mentioned in Osher’s story, but within the notice, the date shows the notice came out in July 2022 (4 months later indeed, not 15 months), but the notice clarifies that Jenifer began taking the pills AFTER the company had already stopped producing pills with Corydalis.

Even though the notice didn’t come out until July 2022, it can’t be deemed too late because it explained that production of the pills containing Corydalis had stopped all the way back on March 1, 2022, and Jenifer wasn’t even taking the pills yet on that date. She began taking the pills for the first time later that March.

That means it doesn’t matter if she saw the notice or not, because by the time she started to take the pills, the company had already stopped using Corydalis, and the notice only acted as a warning to people who had already been taking it before her. That’s why it was classified as a weaker notice, because Corydalis had already been removed four months prior. Osher never confronts this; he forces the reader to believe the MED had evidence at this time that the pills were dangerous, and at this time, when they released the first notice, they clearly did not; the pills were deemed safe due to the substituted ingredient with months of no complaints, and it didn’t come out 4 months late because the ingredient had been substituted four months prior.

Here is what’s even more nuts, which we can now triangulate from the new clue in the text to determine what is really true: March 2022 is when health officials started getting complaints, and March 2022, the same month, the company stopped manufacturing the pills with Corydalis. Then, after the Corydalis was removed, Jenifer came along later that March and began taking the pills.

We also need to highlight another new claim we obtained from the intro, as Osher’s readers, the take away from this rigamarole: “Now, despite never having liver problems before, according to her medical records, she has liver damage at age 53; her doctor says she will ultimately need a transplant.”

This is where he concludes, by simply announcing, that the MED’s delay has caused the need for Jenifer’s liver transplant, backed by the authority of “medical records.” Of course you can be sure that the records show the need to replace a liver, but I read between the lines. They do not show any link between her need to replace her liver and the pills. The need to replace a liver might very well be a lifelong problem, not a problem from taking these pills for a year or so. Most, if not all, who took the pills recovered back to normal within weeks or months.

Since you can see now that it was only four months, not fifteen, that the notice can’t be deemed late, and why it was not a warning, what about the June 2023 date that leads Osher to hit a fifteen-month delay timestamp? Was that just a typo? Ladies and gentlemen, no it was not a typo. It was a true statement. Osher tends to use true facts for his deception, a distinguishing characteristic of false light: the statements can be true out of context or when the referents could be many, but the combination of statements pretends one follows from the other, or that the subject is not what you think it is when it comes time for clarification to become ambiguous. Additionally, one of his crutches is to use variable names for variable referents which the audience views as synonyms for the same referent. Knowing all that now, and because I’m confirming the dates are all true, go have a look now, I dare you; you won’t be able to figure out what the heck is going on. But the headline is now confirmed: “Regulators Knew This Marijuana Product Was Harming People. It stayed on the shelves for more than a year.” Now we are back to fifteen months so there is more work to be done.

Photo: Stephen Swofford/The Denver Gazette, from the article examined here.

To be sure we didn’t miss anything so far, the poster image fills the victim archetype with design. In this case, special lighting and shadows evoke a feeling of darkness and depression over what appears to be fine with a caption containing the second headline the reader is impressed with: “Jenifer and her husband, Luke, at home. Jenifer was diagnosed with liver damage after taking marijuana-based sleep pills.”

The reader unaware of the conversation we are having here, meanwhile, has now completed the introduction to Osher’s story without a flinch: The details are irrelevant, so complex and twisted that the reader can’t figure it out; they easily rely on the trusted journalists and the brands to have done their work, for the reader simply needs the impression, which is that the MED took 15 months to do nothing (didn’t act, didn’t dig deeper), then put out a weak notice because they are incompetent, the reader gets, leading to victims in the community just like Jenifer who will need a liver transplant…and if only she knew. Osher goes on to impress upon the reader that she will die because of this, literally. If she knew about this notice, however, she would have been saved, the reader now believes. That is, “the state’s Marijuana Enforcement Division” took “nearly 15 months” and thus, backed by real “medical records,” caused her to “ultimately need a transplant.”

You might be thinking that now that you have the intro, Osher will go on to explain the details but he never does. You would first have to read 1330 more words (about the length of the Declaration of Independence) before you would get any more of the information you would need to connect any more dots. Spoiler alert: There were two notices, not one. 1330 words later after the introduction you get the following additional clues, out of context:

By May 2024, the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment would receive 52 reports of harm involving Midnight Drops, at least 20 severe enough to require medical care. Of those reports, 25 occurred before the MED’s second notification. While the health department often does the initial review, records show it typically finished gathering information within days, which would trigger an automatic referral to the MED.

The second notification unveiled, if you happen to be wondering about it. It’s crazy that Osher jumped ahead to May 2024 because production of the pills stopped in June 2023, and they continued to be sold and marketed until September, so all pills were essentially off the shelves permanently by the fall of 2023. He continues by jumping back to the timeline we have been working on:

Nearly a year after issuing its first “informational notification,” the MED and the health department issued the second one in June 2023, warning that Midnight Drops had continued generating reports of “acute liver injury.”

At that time, Sima announced it was stopping production. But Barsoom and his companies continued marketing Midnight Drops for several more months and did not adequately warn dispensaries to stop selling them, according to a Colorado attorney general’s office investigation.

Jenifer didn’t see the second MED notification either. A couple of weeks after it was posted, she went into a dispensary but learned the drops were no longer in stock. She said a dispensary staffer told her they had been pulled because consumers had been abusing the product. She hadn’t been, so she didn’t worry.

The paragraphs make clear Osher collapses a later complaint total into an earlier regulatory timeline without clearly explaining the distinction that there were two notices, and thus, two independent investigations, not one. The product name on the shelf hadn’t changed, but the ingredients had.

Osher’s full story relies upon the headline, the photo, the caption and introduction. Jenifer is the victim and the MED is the villain because the MED takes too long to regulate. If something about that logical conclusion were to break down, for example, if the time frame could not be established, actually, the story would need to be retracted. Or, if the average delay, which Osher later calculates as seven months, could not be established, the story would need to be retracted. And for example, if the delay or the harm could not be attributed to the MED, then certainly, the story would need to be retracted. After reading the story through from beginning to end, any one of those reasons alone must lead to retraction.

The Midnight Drops Timeline Does Not Establish When MED Knew, a Requirement to Prevent Retraction That Can’t be Met

In order to show how long it took the MED, there is still work to be done which we can do to show the actual end dates of the two investigations, because those two dates are marked by the dates of the two public MED notices. But it doesn’t matter. Osher does not establish when regulators first learned of the problem, leaving it impossible to know the start date of when they knew.

I would like to call your attention to a line Osher slipped into the passage above while you were looking the other way, when he introduced the “Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment,” a separate department from the MED. The Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) is the agency that receives health problem reports, and then if they deem there is an issue for the MED to investigate, they send the case forward. Just above while we were busy learning there were two notices and trying to correlate end dates, Osher wrote “While the health department often does the initial review, records show it typically finished gathering information within days, which would trigger an automatic referral to the MED.”

So I have to stop and ask, were you by chance thinking that the start date thus begins the clock in March 2022, when the MED first knew? If so, it’s possible that you were duped by one of Osher’s multi-referent tricks that you assumed was synonymous: “health officials” and “regulators.” As it turns out in this story, I found, strictly, the phrase “Colorado public-health officials,” which relates to the very first sentence in the entire article, refers to the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment, not the Marijuana Enforcement Division (MED). The MED is a department within the Colorado Department of Revenue. That must of been on purpose because Osher can not determine when the CDPHE passed the cased to the MED, or even if it did at all.

In the story we read so far, the clock begins at the wrong time due to having one pulled over our heads, it must begin when the CDPHE transferred the complaint to the MED, which Osher admits he doesn’t know but in a way you wouldn’t notice. The reason he placed this new point 1330+ words in was to convince the reader that the handoff “typically” happens within days, but as I show below, there are more reasons than not to conclude this case was anything but typical. Either way, typical or not, the sentence he just pulled over on us admits that it’s the best he can do for a start date, which is to say all he can do is speculate: “While the health department often does the initial review, records show it typically finished gathering information within days, which would trigger an automatic referral to the MED.”

Therefore one can only speculate on the start time of when the MED knew. Nothing else you can do.

Even the Dec. 2022 time stamp later used as a marker for when MED knew about the second round of problems, leading to the second notice (which would be far less than a year later), can’t stand; the article only says that date came from an appearance in “state records” State records could refer to CDPHE records, records obtained through the AG’s investigation. Had they come from MED, he would have likely said MED records instead of state records to identify which records they were. The reality is, when reading Chris Osher, you have to be on the lookout for this kind of stuff.

Everything about the start dates are deceptive, speculative, and unsupported.

To conclude, it doesn’t even matter what the issue is with the notice dates, nor the opinion that it’s too long, be it four months in, or fifteen months in after two investigations, or both, because without knowing the start dates, you can’t know what happened when. Nor can you know what was discussed as part of the investigation and why they made the decisions they did. Once the supplement was replaced, it took a while for the CDPHE to receive new claims, but once they did, it’s unknown if and when they handed the investigation over to the MED.

Even though you may have no idea still what is going on with the two end dates, it doesn’t matter; the start date cannot be calculated, and the article must be retracted.

The MED’s Seven-Month Average Delay Claim Must Be Thrown Out, a Requirement to Prevent Retraction That Can’t be Met

Having possibly anticipated that at least one person in the world might try to unravel Osher’s works, as if offering a backup excuse but on theoretical terms, Osher goes on in the article to create a custom average for the amount of time it takes the MED to respond to cases in general, and rests at “seven months,” supporting the broader claim, for example, that Midnight Drops was “not an anomaly,” as Osher concludes. That’s why the seven-month time delay calculation must lead to retraction if it is not true, or plausible, because the example with the victim is just that, an example for the greater claim that the MED is all around too slow to respond with everything. Osher added the byline of a data science journalist who I will not name in order to protect his involvement from Osher’s apparent fraudulent manipulation of the data.

Osher obtained no MED investigative records concerning the matters of the supplements. MED withheld the complete case file, as they did and do for all case files, leaving the reporters unable to determine what evidence the agency possessed, what the agency investigated, when the agency investigated, why it declined to impose an administrative hold, or why it selected its particular response. The article fills that showstopper of a gap with an insubstantial, manufactured reconstruction based on unrelated enforcement records and partial records covering only a fraction of the advisories over an unreleased time frame with unreleased severities, then arrives at an average of seven months somehow, and then presents the resulting reconstruction as an authoritative account of MED’s failure: the article goes up and down and all around to convince the audience that the MED caused the victim’s harm.

To turn that episode into an indictment of Colorado’s regulatory system, the reporters must show that lengthy delays are normal across many cases of the same type and severity, and within a current date range that reflects the state of delays today. Their seven-month figure is what supposedly makes the company’s pills “not an anomaly,” according to the article. But the measurement, as I detail below, is incoherent. The small sample of notices they obtained had no investigative case data; they merely attempted to triangulate dates based on when a public notice was issued, and when a dispensary, company, or the agency received their first complaint.

Of the small data set of advisory dates they could piece together, 23 of 83, there was no information about how they compared or when they were from, and amazingly, they even combine two different starting events to calculate the average: the date MED received a complaint and the date MED began an investigation. Those dates are not interchangeable. An investigation might begin days or months after the first complaint and depend on the occurrence and severity of additional complaints, which could reasonably take months. Pooling the two categories produces an average without one consistent meaning. Now we know that CDPHE might be intertwined, too. While the use of false light is used for people and in this case the MED, when applied to data, it’s deception.

What’s more, the five-year window creates another massive blind spot that alone leaves a calculation practically impossible. The article provides no annual breakdown, so readers cannot determine whether the small dataset of usable and comparable start-date cases used to create the seven-month average is out of date. The sample could have come mainly from the beginning of the five-year period for all we know. The available cases could largely describe agency performance several years ago but not today. MED says it has improved its advisory process, while Osher audaciously claims from the same data set that delays have grown longer without providing supporting evidence or even mentioning how that determination came to be. It’s all just hearsay.

There is another factor which renders the seven-month average impossible to calculate without the notice data: advisories may involve radically different problems, from minor labeling violations to routine contaminant failures to complex medical complaints and urgent hazards. Treating every advisory as an equivalent unit to say it takes the agency seven months to act is nothing short of bat-shit crazy.

There is no list of the advisories, no individual dates, no median, no range, no distribution, and no indication of how much the longest cases influenced the mean. One or two extreme delays could pull the average upward while most cases moved much faster. Readers are given a number that cannot stand.

The incomplete and inconsistently defined sample cannot establish MED’s typical response time. Period. The complete dataset should have been published, with every starting date, warning date, case type, and calculation available for examination. To be clear, no data was provided. Zero. This is a flaw that requires a serious discussion with a real editor about whether the article should be retracted if it can’t be transformationally fixed.

Audacious Claim That the Same Dataset Which Cannot Establish a Legitimate Average Response Time Further Shows That Response Times Have Gotten Worse

The writer Chris Osher goes way beyond claiming that MED takes too long: he claims the delays have actually gotten longer, even after the 2023 law expanded the agency’s powers.

Osher writes: “the time it takes to warn consumers after the first complaint as well as after the date when a product goes on sale have both gotten longer.”

That’s it. That’s all he said about it. I triple-checked the whole story because you would assume he would provide some rationale of some kind, for example, to say that the delay has gotten longer because ____[fill in the blank]____, but no, nothing. He just stated it matter-of-factly, and that’s it.

He then quotes MED’s spokesperson saying the agency has improved its advisory process, setting up the impression that the reporters’ data exposes an agency being dishonest with his false light arrangement. Osher faults MED for disputing that analysis without providing evidence, because he is an investigative journalist who carries authority and thus the audience would likely think the company is hiding something if they won’t talk to him. It’s such a farce; I have written before that it’s like Chris Osher is dressing up in a police uniform and then going out into the city to patrol people under false authority. Here he is demanding to rummage through other people’s lives and business.

The claim that the MED’s delay caused the need for a liver replacement can’t be shown to be plausible, leaving a requirement to prevent retraction that can’t be met

Is Jenifer’s reported course typical?

Not at all. Though there are hundreds of people at least who reported liver issues related to taking Midnight Drops, I was not able to find anyone who didn’t recover within weeks or months after ceasing to take the pill. Nothing like the need for a liver replacement. Her reported course is unusual and requires considerably more explanation than the article provides, including information about any exposure to other liver-injury-inducing chemicals that may have occurred in Jenifer’s life.

The article states that, prior to use, there were “No known liver problems,” which does not mean she had a demonstrably healthy liver before taking the pills. Liver disease can remain silent for decades. The story even noted that she was a drinker, but according to Osher, according to her doctor, according to Jenifer’s word for the sake of this public exposé, her apparent lifelong alcohol use has not been “heavy,” she said. The story provides no other medical evidence needed to determine whether the pills independently caused her advanced liver injury (cirrhosis), accelerated an undetected condition, or contributed alongside another cause.

That is completely different from the classic pattern of liver injury returning to normal after a few weeks or months. The patients in the published Corydalis case series related to the notice recovered completely after discontinuing the product. Corydalis case series. The article goes on to note that the reports MED received were classified as “liver injury,” though a “liver injury” can mean nothing more than sufficiently elevated blood-test results. A liver injury can start off with or include mild hepatitis, which is symptomless and treated in a few weeks. A liver transplant is reserved for an entirely different level of illness: irreversible end-stage disease or life-threatening acute liver failure. Acute liver failure generally involves impaired clotting.

He went further. Shamelessly, Osher created the impression that Jenifer experienced full-body cramps and lactose intolerance, which are not classic or specific symptoms of hepatitis or liver injury and, more likely than not, have nothing to do with it. There are no reports anywhere that I could find of anyone else ever experiencing those symptoms from these two dietary supplements, nor are they recognized effects of marijuana use. They might have accompanied an underlying illness, but those symptoms do not connect in any significant way to the supplements or marijuana in question. They are here, used deceptively to make you feel something. These symptoms were likely true, but the only plausible explanation for dropping them into this story is Osher’s intent to bulk up an emotional reaction, deceptively so. Such a writing style fits propaganda, not professional investigative journalism.

In March 2022, Sima, the company that manufactured the sleeping pills, says it replaced Corydalis with a Stephania extract. That was a botanical substitution, but apparently not a complete chemical departure: the replacement extract consisted primarily of an alkaloid found in Corydalis, too. This is why the story continued after Corydalis was replaced. Same type of ingredient, different source.

To be honest, as with Corydalis, the replacement supplement Stephania is legal and under the regulatory domain of the FDA in the dietary supplement industry. I haven’t been able to find any FDA notice or ban. But the Gazette is not here to talk about that; it’s marijuana they apparently want to get rid of.

The Denver Gazette Went After The Cannabis Industry, But Not The Source of The Harm

Commenters on Bluesky who reacted to the article point out, but only begin to touch on, the fact that the article is deceptive and its use of investigative resources is misguided because the source of the harm in Jenifer’s case is related to a non-marijuana substance controlled by a different industry.

As many commenters pointed out, the Denver Gazette chose to present the story as an industry-level “marijuana-based” harm, as it says in the headline, caption, and introduction, but the true source of the harm for the alleged victim in his story came from a dietary supplement, which is classified as a product of the “nutritional supplement” industry.

The government regulators being prosecuted in the headline and throughout the story are the regulators at the Marijuana Enforcement Division (MED) in Colorado, as if the big problem here is that they cause harm by being too slow to act, a large-scale government problem with cannabis, according to Osher on behalf of Phil Anschutz, as to why the industry is bad.

The source of the harm in the story is not actually marijuana, though, nor is it harm that arises only when paired with marijuana (see the studies in the comments below); the harm in this story comes from two dietary supplements, as mentioned, called Corydalis and Stephania, which can be marketed without FDA approval and without advance proof of safety and effectiveness. The FDA is the authority that is in charge of any regulation of the two substances, not the MED, which undermines the entire story.

The FDA specifically treats Corydalis yanhusuo as a “dietary ingredient” for labeling purposes. In a 2023 notice I found from the FDA it noted that a manufacturer’s product was misbranded because its label merely said “Corydalis” instead of identifying the standardized botanical name Corydalis yanhusuo. That demonstrates that the FDA regulates it. I have not found a general FDA ban or consumer warning against the Corydalis or the Stephania extract used in Midnight Drops, which is the pill that was being sold through dispensaries the article focuses on.

This is where an honest investigative journalist would stop and consider a pivot, or at least reason with the audience: Why hasn’t the FDA issued a corresponding safety warning? Has the absence of federal action left MED having to figure this out? Most importantly, removing the harmful product from the marijuana industry doesn’t remove it from any other industry. I had a look and found the equivalent product with an equivalent extract available for purchase on Amazon. As an investigative journalist, why not stop and consider going after the source, which is a dietary supplement, and use the resources to focus on the bigger fish, the FDA regulators? Why not push the FDA to ban the harmful drug that Osher tries to prove took the MED too long to investigate and take down? By focusing the story on the harm itself, Osher could help to warn consumers about the still-existing problem.

Osher charged ahead against the marijuana regulators anyway, and doubled down. He went around and dug up documents and pretends he triangulated a start date for when the MED knew of the harm before issuing a notice, to convince the audience that marijuana products are causing people to die.

The bulk of the work in Osher’s article is attempting to lead the reader into the impression and belief that there is an evil marijuana industry in Colorado where the government regulators (specifically the MED as his target) literally care more about money for themselves than regulating (he really makes that point but with no data or explanation), and that if the MED didn’t take an average of seven months to act on such cases, literally, people would not be dying. Osher did not obtain any significant data to calculate a delay, so instead of truth, he uses deception to manipulate the data and false light to prosecute. No one is dying, no one died, no one is expected to die, by the way, but in the story, he really does try to persuade the reader to believe MED is causing it all by delay.

That’s enough, the series should come down and Osher should be let go in my opinion. But there is still a ton more to show.

What. A. Mess.

Agency Powers

In parading the MED as a failure in addressing an industry-wide problem, Osher leaves readers with the impression that the agency had no power to stop sales, an industry-wide governmental problem. That impression is false. Pre-2023 rules allowed administrative holds when investigators had reasonable grounds to believe marijuana products threatened public safety. MED already had a mechanism to freeze inventory and prohibit its sale at the end of 2022 they could have applied to the second investigation. I confirmed that the rule prohibited transfers of inventory under a hold, where “transfer” expressly included sales to consumers. It also required the products to be physically segregated at the licensed premises. The pills could remain inside the store, but set away and unavailable for purchase. 2022 rules, 8-110(B) January 2023 fiscal note; 2023 law

Yet the story says MED “didn’t have the power to pull the drops from the stores in this situation,” which is true. This shameless manipulation of words convinces Osher’s audience to believe that the MED wasn’t even able to stop sales and thus the marijuana industry is flawed, but notice the way he frames it to be a true statement, blaming the MED for being unable to “pull the drops from the stores.” While the MED could not raid the stores and seize the pills, they could legally demand that they stop sales while the drops remained in the stores as the investigation continued, unavailable for purchase. The FDA permits the ingredient to be sold without any restrictions.

Entrenched in Appeal to Emotion

Osher pulled out of his bag of tricks one of his more wicked false light staples, an underhanded method of using an appeal to emotion in ways that would put many movie producers to shame. In this example, he tells the story of a second injury: Jenifer’s husband Luke’s broken hand.

Two days before Thanksgiving, Luke couldn’t sleep and rose about 2 a.m. to Google information about cirrhosis. He said it was then that he finally discovered the MED’s notifications about Midnight Drops.

He started slamming his fists on the armrests of his desk chair. One armrest broke, and his fist hit jagged plastic, fracturing his left hand.

“Jen, they killed you,” he recalled shouting.

The quotation does not identify who “they” are, yet its placement in the story next to the discovery of the MED notice invites (nearly forces) readers to attach that accusation to the agency. The emotional force makes it difficult for anyone to cover their eyes from the movie-like scene meant to cause the audience to connect the dots and conclude the reality and feelings the director wants them to feel: he finally discovered the killer, the MED, for a notification about Midnight Drops he never saw.

In adding another layer of suffering to the narrative, Osher is masterfully strengthening the impression of regulatory blame without supplying the missing connection between MED’s timing and the medical outcome. The scene makes the accusation more painful to read and serves his prosecutorial purpose, but offers no reason to exist for an investigative journalism purpose.

My favorite class in undergraduate school was logic. True or false? In logic, an appeal to emotion becomes fallacious when an emotional response substitutes for a premise needed to support the conclusion. “This person suffered” and “this suffering deserves our concern” do not establish that a particular institution caused the suffering or could have prevented it. That conclusion requires an additional connection supported by evidence. The fallacy occurs when sympathy, fear, or anger supplies the persuasive force of that missing connection, making readers feel that the accusation has been established when it has only been made emotionally compelling. The conclusion then does not follow. This is an informal fallacy of relevance: the emotion may be appropriate to the suffering while failing to establish the responsibility being asserted, in this case, through what appears to be intentional deception. Appeal to emotion can work when it is combined with facts, but here its role is fallacious because its purpose is to substitute for facts.

But

Osher writes: “After she stopped taking the drops, her liver enzymes came back into normal ranges, but the damage was already done, her medical records show.”

The “but” trick is a wicked one I’ve seen Osher use. Perfectly fine for everyone in good faith to use the word but throughout, but in Osher’s use case, it leads readers to complete this causal narrative: Stopping the pills helped, but the pills had already done the damage.

This type of fallacy is called causal insinuation through contrast, a rhetorical technique that implies one event caused another by highlighting a sharp difference between two situations. Instead of explicitly stating “X caused Y,” the speaker places two contrasting facts side by side, forcing the listener’s brain to instinctively fill in the causal link.

The phrase “already done” also introduces a missed opportunity. Within this story about MED’s delays, Osher suggests that earlier intervention would have prevented the damage. But the sentence establishes neither when that damage developed nor whether an earlier warning would have prevented it.

Documenting lasting liver damage, attributing that damage to the pills, and establishing that MED’s delay allowed it to occur are three separate propositions which all fail. “Her medical records show” does not do the work of establishing anything related to any of the propositions. We can know this because Osher tried so hard to use the doctor as an authority to impress upon the readers that what the doctor speculated on with no prior medical records was truth. For an honest investigative journalist seeking the truth, the records only show the need to replace a liver, but anything else would be a mere hunch, not even a hypothesis, certainly not an opportunity to lead the reader with psychological tricks into believing that an entire industry should come down.

Showing the Data Is Too Late

A limited presentation of the data cannot be spun up as a refutation by now retorting with “Well, we do have the data, we just don’t need to show you, trust us,” or with “Look, here is one,” or “here is another.” Nor would providing all of the data undo the damage that has already been done by the techniques used to convince the reader; it’s deceptive.

When deception is applied in journalism for the purpose of a prosecutorial attack on people or groups, for example, that’s a social crime which, I believe, straddles the boundaries of a criminal one. Such a social crime is not only sad for everyone on all sides of the political spectrum, given that this type of deceptive, persuasive methodology is used under the guise of journalism; consider that they are doing it to their own readers, the people they want to vote with them and give them money for this type of content. They are playing these tricks on their own constituents. The impression I’m describing amounts to: MED KNEW. THEY KILLED HER. As if you knew the case would be conclusive before you even read the story, because it carried the badge of a societal authority you were supposed to trust.

The Conclusion is an Opinion

Even if Osher proved somehow that the MED is “too late”, in his opinion of whatever too late means, the conclusion is an opinion (How long is too late for the MED to issue a warning?) that invites the audience to argue a different opinion of what is too late. This is not an investigative report that dug up new facts to prosecute a new villain, it’s just an opinion based on unsupported guesswork.

Sinister Politics At Play

One of the most expected flaws arising from anticipated political bias occurred, and it’s beyond ironic…at least three times beyond.

Level-One Irony

We know the true source of the harm is not originating from the marijuana industry; it is originating from the nutritional supplement industry. Since the FDA has the power to regulate federally but didn’t, we relied on the state, which fell into the lap of MED. Even though the MED did issue notices, who really acted?

That brings us to the end of the story: the unsung heroes. The MED had to figure out and deal with these legal nutritional supplements, twice, and they did that work for the consumers of Colorado, not to get money for themselves (that’s an outrageous claim), but whatever they do get goes to improving their response time and into Colorado. And it was Colorado’s Attorney General going directly to the company on behalf of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act, telling the company that they must completely stop working in the industry for a lengthy period of time, or else be sued. The AG got the companies involved to stop and retained hundreds of thousands of dollars from them in a settlement allotted for the people of Colorado, including possible restitution for those who were harmed.

In other words, the marijuana regulatory system run by Colorado government, according to the limited data in the story, appears to be working, for the state handled the investigations that the FDA did not (or maybe the FDA did handle them; we don’t know because there are no case records; it could have been deferred to the FDA and they took a long time to come back with a determination for all we know), and the AG backed up the MED, and then cleaned things up.

Level-Two Irony

Even more ironic, but not the most ironic yet, is the degree to which The Gazette relied on the actions of the Attorney General for its reporting, for without the related information publicized by the AG, Osher wouldn’t even have a victim or enough data on timing to make her case into a story.

Osher’s Denver Gazette story refers to the attorney general’s office four times across three passages: three explicit mentions and one indirect reference. Early in the story, it credits the “state attorney general’s office” with discovering that Sima received complaints two years before public-health officials did. Midway through, it attributes continued marketing and inadequate notification to dispensaries to a “Colorado attorney general’s office investigation.” Near the end, it states that the owner and his companies settled with “the attorney general’s office” to resolve “the office’s investigation.” The closing passage also discusses the $400,000 payment, Colorado sales restriction, apology, and the couple’s reaction, further describing the settlement and its consequences.

Who is this Attorney General whose name is all over the documents and media reporting on this story as it was publicly developed over the years by others like Westword, CBS Colorado, and KRDO Colorado Springs, while this person’s name was never mentioned even once by The Denver Gazette in all the instances mentioned above when Osher wrote “the office” or “the state attorney general’s office”?

The name of the hero for Coloradans behind this story is Phil Weiser, Democratic nominee to be the next Governor of Colorado, presumably enemy number one to the Republican company’s mission. The Denver Gazette would not DARE mention Phil Weiser’s name in such a piece that illuminates that he’s the best man for the job to resolve their complaints, aggressively regulates, and is the most top-tier authority they rely upon for the entire story.

Level-Three Irony (Highest Level)

Jenifer didn’t even see it.

We already got the message at the story’s opening turning point: “Jenifer didn’t even see it.” That line bears recalling because in the end, after the dust has settled, we are left to ponder with Luke these final lines of the article:

“How are people supposed to know this?” Luke asked. “The only way I found this stuff was by digging and digging and digging on the internet.”

If ever there was a moment where it would be the right time to turn the mirror to the author, now is that right time.

When the MED puts out their advisories, such as this one referenced in this closing that Luke had to dig and dig and dig to find, of course Jenifer and Luke cannot be blamed for not monitoring the FDA and MED websites for recall notices; that’s the job of the media. When the MED issues a notice, it’s the job of the media to warn consumers of that information.

The original MED/CDPHE notice was issued July 22, 2022. Thomas Mitchell’s Westword article appeared July 25, 2022, three days later under the headline “Marijuana Edibles With Corydalis Extract Receive Liver Injury Warning.” It identified Midnight Drops, discussed Corydalis and liver injury, and reported the company’s account of removing the ingredient.

Westword also covered the second notice: Mitchell’s “Midnight Line of Cannabis Sleep Products Pulled After More Liver Injuries” appeared June 5, 2023, four days after the June 1 follow-up.

For the two Gazettes? You guessed it. No notice.

I was not able to find any article from either the Colorado Springs Gazette or the Denver Gazette providing any notice ever.

I searched both websites, I searched Google manually, I used its AI mode, I asked ChatGPT and I used terms including:

– Midnight Drops and 1906
– Sima Sciences and Peter Barsoom
– Corydalis and Stephania
– Sleep pills, liver injury, and recalls

None produced a relevant Gazette article predating this September 4, 2026, article of any kind warning their readers.

The highest-level ironic reality which I believe we have now witnessed as a real-world example of potentially significant, real-world dangerous harm that could possibly occur from such political deception disguised as trusted journalism, is that if Jenifer is a Republican and had been paying Phil Anschutz for a subscription, instead of following the free Westword, which is useful for everyone and would never deceive people about such health matters for political persuasion, then Phil Anschutz and the Gazettes using Chris Osher as their monster, all together, could have failed her liver the most.

The first report of the problem that started the entire record for this story came into the company in 2020. Now here we are in 2026, six years later, and it’s all settled down now. The pills are off the shelves, the company is gone from Colorado, money that could be used for victims has been received, Jenifer is expected to live, and the MED says it’s improving. Anyone digging up The Denver Gazette’s story now is finding an account that arrived years too late, unable to serve as a timely warning about those pills, or to act as an antidote for anyone in the future. The Gazette closes by demanding to know why consumers weren’t informed, while having left its own role in informing by the side of the road to die; the answer is staring them in the face through the mirror.

What, if anything, can be gained by anyone from the Denver Gazette’s unhinged article here? For anyone like Luke who is looking on the internet for answers, this piece would only distract and waste time in a search for up-to-date, legitimate, truthful information.

Meanwhile, anyone in Colorado can buy the same Corydalis yanhusuo extract used in Midnight Drops from Amazon on same-day delivery. I looked at the extract and it’s comparable; reviewers love that it works so well in putting them to sleep.

All Journalism is Media But Not All Media Is Journalism

By now in the year 2026, I have completely hijacked Jay Rosen’s distinction between journalism and other forms of media. He pointed it out for the world; I took it in as my own and began going in my own direction, unauthorized. For me, it’s an excellent entry point into considering the distinction.

“Journalism” and “Media” are not interchangeable words. Journalism is a certain type of media. There are many ways to define it, and many places you can go to see it by example. There is one particularly relevant place to examine the boundary between journalism and other forms of media, by the standards a publication promises to uphold. You can stand there right on the border and watch where a piece of media remains within those standards and where it crosses over. You can see how even the changing of a single word can turn a reported suspicion into an assertion of fact. If a company says it doesn’t take money for stories, which is a standard ethical rule, and then they do, the article exits journalism and enters into some other category of media.

The Associated Press, The Wall Street Journal, and The New York Times, acting as popular examples of companies that set out to practice journalism, publish guidelines and ethical promises that they commit themselves to follow, in good faith, when doing their work. They don’t always get it ethically right (New York Times, I’m looking at you). And they sometimes break their own rules. But when they do, for whatever reason, accountability requires them to address the failure and correct their work. Accountability is just part of the production process to correct mistakes. It’s a key production quality, much like a department store’s promise to replace a broken product: it is how they maintain the integrity of their products, their businesses, and in this case, their authority in culture for documenting the truth. Accountability is culturally feared in the journalism industry, but it should be the other way around. Journalists should be praised for recognizing mistakes and communicating with readers to get at a better historical record.

Media is the larger category which includes everything else that is not journalism: It can include a fictional crime story, a movie script, a staged photograph, a wrong-way road sign, on and on. It also includes work that looks like journalism while serving another purpose, such as the news-show format of The Daily Show’s comedy. Jon Stewart calls it comedy and outright refuses the journalism title; or take, for example, the National Enquirer, which simply does whatever is legal (I’ve looked; they don’t make ANY ethical promises), and so on.

Unless you are Derrida or some kind of deconstructionist, one quality all journalism has, which is critical to be considered journalism regardless of any specific terms, is that it must be truthful. It can’t be untruthful or deceptive. That crosses the line into another form of media. That’s why Chris Osher’s media cannot be considered journalism; it must be some other form. And it’s not okay.

The Denver Gazette is Using ProPublica By Fooling It, Or Else ProPublica Condones This Type of Media Deception

This work of Osher’s by the Denver Gazette, believe it or not, was allegedly funded by ProPublica and not the other way around. That ProPublica gave its investigative journalism authority and money to pay for billionaire Phil Anschutz’s deceptive media while its own reporters were on strike for being underpaid is something else. Hopefully ProPublica did not know what is going on at the Gazettes behind the scenes, actually. That The Denver Gazette is using ProPublica for its authority, reach and attention with this type and level of deception takes this to a new level of importance. As I’ve argued here, I believe Anschutz’s business is using deceptive media practices to sway public opinion through false light and deceptive narratives. Does ProPublica want to be known for this? I would guess not; my guess is that Osher is the one exposing and dragging down everyone, including those at the Gazettes who can’t all be in bad faith; it’s too hard to believe that everyone is deceptive and doesn’t care about the truth. Deceptive? That’s a big line to cross. I’m always looking for excuses for others and believe Osher made it this far through an industry-wide culture of blind trust in itself. He may have been left unattended here without any real editorial oversight. Reen seems busy, presumably the only editor Osher reports to.

It’s not only ironic but harmful for society that ProPublica’s investigative prowess and authority are being used to legitimize this type of work. For Anschutz, this is a media coup: the Gazette gets the benefit of ProPublica’s authority and reputation, where now readers are asked to trust reporting which does not support reality.

This puts ProPublica in a position where its response will tell a lot, for it will indicate what to expect from ProPublica in the future with its reporting. What kind of company are they, really? Will they make any changes to the article? Will they continue with this type of series? Does it look the other way when the mirror turns onto it? Will it sweep this under the table unless actual journalists create pressure? I am not a journalist and do not have any institutional authority or reach to move anyone if they wish to ignore me; this is just an opinion piece on a blog. I am not a journalist with a code of ethics, but everything I have ever written in my life is truthful and in good faith. I have never written or acted with deception, nor will I ever, that is the promise I make. I do make minor mistakes and want to correct them. Let me know if you find any errors. While I expect to be ignored with this article, my questions do not become less serious for ProPublica because I am the one asking them.

What about the Denver Gazette? Osher is the head of the Denver Gazette’s investigative reporting department. Will they continue to use this deceptive style of media when attacking the people and institutions of Colorado under the guise of investigative journalism, despite the fact that Osher’s deception has now been shown to be a pattern? If you would like to see a near-mirror breakdown of Osher using the same prosecutorial and false light tricks to mislead investigators into a false arrest, see my CCPA case documents starting with paragraph 11 from this PDF.

Will Chris Reen look the other way? Will anyone make even a single update to anything? I highly doubt it. Go ahead and be silent if you want; the world can move forward unchanged without an honest record and without integrity, but our information society and all of us in it will be worse off for it.

+

86 47 is Silly and Serious

The timeline goes a little….like this:

PART I 

Silly: Former FBI director James Comey shared a photo via Instagram on May 15, 2025 with a seashell arrangement of the numbers “86 47” that he said he found on a North Carolina beach. Via The Guardian, the original post that started it all:

To 86 something is common slang to “throw out” and 47 refers to Donald Trump, the 47th president of the United States. “86 47” then was, in many people’s opinions, a silly way of saying, get rid of the President: Impeach.

Serious: But because…apparently….Trump, Comey was charged with making a threat against the president’s life, and transmitting that threat through “interstate commerce.” I.e. THE INTERNET. The DOJ indictment quotes the current Attorney General, Todd Blanche: “Threatening the life of the President of the United States is a grave violation of our nation’s laws”.

The reason The Guardian, other news outlets, and I have reproduced the image is to document and analyze it as a matter of public interest. It’s inclusion here is solely for the purpose of reporting, commentary, and memetic analysis.

At the moment, Comey actually faces ten years in jail. To so many people, it seems so silly, and dismissible, and yet, I can certainly imagine he must be under significant duress, for the outcome of ten years in prison would be severe. Comey is arguing that the prosecution is politically motivated, and that the seashell post is protected speech under the First Amendment.

PART II

Silly: Just a few weeks ago, on June 11, 2026, police opened an investigation into a massive “86 47” burned into the National Mall lawn in Washington, D.C.

Photographer Nathan Howard appears to have been the first person to capture it, having received a tip that police were on their way, or discovered it “emerging” himself, per Reuters.

"A Reuters photographer atop the Washington Monument saw the apparent marking in the grass near the World War Two Memorial shortly before authorities arrived at the scene."

My first thought? Banksy. It fits the style, ambition, and cultural impact of his work. Who else besides Banksy has the technical expertise to execute something like this? Considering the level of surveillance around Washington, D.C. from so many agencies, it would seem virtually impossible for one to reasonably expect they would not be found.

A close-up of the 8 shows how the numbers were created with uniform circles, through a method that caused the grass to die and turn brown. Perhaps some kind of chemical was concealed in a backpack or on the person and then pumped through an inconspicuous spray or tubing onto the grass.

The EarthCam from the Washington Monument shows how and when it may have been created on June 8th. In a timelapse published by PBS News Hour, you can see relevant patterns of movement by people tracing out the area.

In one amazing round of public commentary, Trump’s Truth Social post, which helped spread the “86 47” meme even further, was reposted by ALT National Park Service on Facebook, complete with a “Community Comment”, along with thousands of interactions from Facebook users, many who were quick to point out that Trump calls numbers, “letters”.

A search for “8647” on Amazon yields over 900 products to date. Here’s a look, sorted by “Featured”:

It’s interesting to see how silly and serious this all seems to be all at the same time.

+

The Doge Meme is Dead

Not much to say to prove this point. Doge has been through a lot. It was originally just a wonderful photograph, then a creative, pure-hearted template for communicating in the forums, evolved into a variant that assumed the identity of a cryptocurrency, and now, it’s mainstream for death caused to people around the world under the direction of Elon Musk.

Consider one recent headline:

“How an Estimated Seven Hundred Thousand People Have Died from DOGE’s U.S.A.I.D. Cuts“

That makes DOGE completely dead. By dead, I don’t mean it no longer exists. It will remain part of internet history, cryptocurrency history, and political history. I mean that its symbolic evolution appears complete. There is no obvious next identity for DOGE that can escape the weight of what the name now represents. Or is there? I mean, just look at that face.

The original photo of Kabosu, a Shiba Inu owned and photographed by kindergarten teacher Atsuko Sato (佐藤 敦子, Satō Atsuko), 2010.

Wikipedia entry: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doge_%28meme%29

+

What Virality Made: The Memetic Emptiness of MrBeast

Jimmy Donaldson, known worldwide as MrBeast, has organized his creative life around the measurable demands of internet platforms. As he has repeatedly explained, his objective is to give the algorithm exactly what it wants. He develops his videos around platform metrics, revises them in response to performance data, and removes whatever reduces their ability to spread. His success is not the product of artistic expression, it’s the systematic optimization for algorithmic selection.

This helps explain why MrBeast’s videos feel so culturally disposable. They’re designed to maximize distribution rather than to communicate ideas.

In 2012, Donaldson began posting on YouTube as MrBeast6000 at the age of thirteen. For the next five years, he searched for anything that could go viral. He says it was his only goal. He later described himself as “relentlessly, unhealthily obsessed with studying virality, studying the YouTube algorithm.” At seventeen, he recorded a message to his future self in which success or failure in his life came down to a number: “If I don’t have a million subscribers when you see this video, my entire life has been a failure.”

After high school, he said, he “did nothing but just hyperstudy what makes a good video, what makes a good thumbnail, what’s good pacing, how to go viral.”

The standard was already contained in the question: a good video, to Donaldson, is defined as one that spreads.

After five years of trying to go viral for the sake of going viral, it’s interesting to look back at his big breakthrough. He asked, “What’s something dumb I could do that would get a lot of attention?” His answer? Count to 100,000. Endurance videos, long one-takes, and supercuts already existed online. The point is not that he didn’t invent a format. The point is why he chose the act. His own explanation begins with the need for attention.

Reflecting on that first video, he said, “I just really wanted it. I had dropped out of college, I wasn’t really making much. I knew it would go viral.”

By nineteen, Donaldson was telling his team, “We’re going to be the biggest YouTube channel ever. I don’t care. I’ll die trying.”

After that, the chronology is beside the point. The goal never changed; it merely acquired money, staff, and a self-aggrandizing production system.

Now he describes views as evidence that he is giving people what they want, and he uses virality as a repeatable technique for producing “practically unlimited money.”

That objective reaches into every part of the product. He says more extreme claims are used to improve click-through. Prize amounts are evaluated according to how much additional click value they produce. Click-through rate, average view duration, and satisfaction surveys became his production inputs.

One director who worked at MrBeast Productions told TIME that platform incentives had led them to study retention graphs to make each new video more addictive. Working at MrBeast, he said, that work was done “on steroids.”

He even has people developing and testing a factory’s worth of title-and-thumbnail concepts before deciding which one to upload. The business tested open- and closed-mouth poster-image expressions, found that closed mouths produced slightly more watch time, and then changed its rulebook and best practices accordingly.

It’s not as if these are separate anecdotes from different stages of a career. They describe one continuous method, governed by the same question every time: Will this improve distribution? The machinery does not arrive afterward to promote the work, it determines what the work becomes.

The leaked MrBeast Production Manual spells it out. Two former producers confirmed that the document was used in the office and given to new employees, but to date, apparently no one from the current MrBeast production team, including his spokesperson, has confirmed or denied its existence. The manual tells employees that their goal is “not the highest quality videos.” It is to make “the best YOUTUBE videos possible.”

That distinction is central to this argument. It is exactly what Donaldson has been preaching all along. His objectives are not secret. He professes the method openly.

The manual names three trackable measures of virality: click-through rate, average view duration, and average view percentage. Those numbers show whether the packaging earned the click and whether the video kept the viewer. It calls click-through rate “what dictates what we do for videos.” The numbers then enter the work itself. The first minute receives special attention because that’s where the most viewers leave. Producers place new material at planned intervals. Endings stop abruptly so viewers do not depart before the video is over. Spending outside the frame is questioned because the audience cannot see it.

The manual also says that a video should excite Donaldson, feel authentic, and make the audience happy. It allows for a subjective “wow factor”, yet when it asks how to determine whether the content is good, the answer is, as you could have probably guessed by now, average view duration and percentage watched. Creativity is defined by tricks for saving money. New ideas are encouraged so long as measurements can certify them. It is a manual for deciding what the work will be in the first place based on the YouTube formula.

This helps explain what I knew in my heart before I learned about his intent: quality has no meaning to Donaldson. He equates quality with whatever the algorithm wants. He repeatedly advises that the word “algorithm” can simply be replaced with “audience.” He treats the two as the same.

You can see how absurd that is:

The audience placed the video on millions of personalized YouTube pages, measured how long each viewer stayed, and expanded its distribution when the numbers improved.

In reality, the audience supplies the behavior and the algorithm separately interprets that behavior to control distribution. Treating them as the same is soulless, as if the machinery between the viewer and the work is all that exists. Such a treatment of people is so dark.

Hello. I am not an algorithm.

People feel, experience, perceive, interpret, imagine, desire, hope, fear, love, grieve, trust, doubt, forgive, resent, empathize, laugh, suffer, wonder, form identities, build relationships, negotiate meaning, exercise judgment, accept uncertainty, revise beliefs, and choose what they value. People can hate-watch a video to the end or stop watching something they love. The algorithm sees none of this directly. It sees only the most minimal traces left by click through behavior and bots, and then converts that raw signal into further distribution.

This explains how MrBeast’s videos can perform so well while being devoid of quality. The system can measure whether people watched. It cannot determine whether what they watched was worthwhile.

Quality is an artistic, evaluative judgment, whereas click-through, retention, and completion are behavioral measurements. The first asks what a work is worth. Donaldson asks what an audience did. Within the MrBeast system, a premise for a video acquires value when it wins the click. A scene acquires value when it prevents departure. A comment, idea, prize, or edit survives only when the graph rewards it. Originality, beauty, coherence, insight, durability, and cultural consequence have no independent standing inside this procedure. They matter only when they can be translated into traces of audience behavior.

In MrBeast’s content, the algorithm and the audience become a single object: measurable behavior. The system can optimize every visible element of a video while remaining indifferent to whether the resulting work was worth making.

What does MrBeast stand for?

Ultimately, MrBeast’s pursuit and the purpose of his content are completely self-serving in the most literal sense: the object is to make MrBeast the biggest YouTuber. The audience enters that pursuit as a field of measurable behavior. People must be induced to click, remain, finish, and return. Their enjoyment matters only if it advances his position.

By contrast, Pixar, at its best, makes films intended to provide cultural value for people. Steve Jobs described his interest in supporting Pixar filmmaking as an opportunity to create stories that would speak to our “grandkids’ grandkids’ grandkids.” While Pixar repeatedly “wins” the commercial competition, its commercial success follows from the artistic quality of work meant for culture itself—a standard established before the audience response.

Jobs: “There’s lots of ways to be, as a person. And some people express their deep appreciation in different ways. But one of the ways that I believe people express their appreciation to the rest of humanity is to make something wonderful and put it out there.

And you never meet the people. You never shake their hands. You never hear their story or tell yours. But somehow, in the act of making something with a great deal of care and love, something’s transmitted there. And it’s a way of expressing to the rest of our species our deep appreciation.”

WALL-E offers a great example. Contrary to the known formula, Andrew Stanton created a long, nearly thirty-minute wordless opening, with a portrait of a solitary machine wandering through an abandoned world. The absence of dialogue, the slow accumulation of detail, and the refusal to explain everything would be obvious no-nos for a MrBeast production. Stanton preserved these qualities because they created the solitude, tenderness, and wonder the story required. “There’s something underestimated about wonder,” he later said. “It’s a hard thing to quantify, but to me that’s the ingredient.”

Like many films, WALL-E was tested too. It is not unhealthy to understand statistics and keep them in mind. But the film was made for audiences, not the algorithm, and its quality standard preceded the audience response. The audience was asked to meet the work where the artist had placed it. In MrBeast’s system, the anticipated audience response determines where the work will be placed.

Compare the cultural value of Toy Story, which cost twenty million dollars to make, with MrBeast’s SquidGames, which cost a hundred million dollars to make. Judged independently of their platform-performance metrics, MrBeast’s videos offer little beyond the machinery of attention. Their premises are thin, their stakes are inflated, their participants become functions of a game, and their editing allows no space for ambiguity, reflection, or discovery. Every moment must justify itself by preventing departure. The result is spectacle engineered for immediate consumption and rapid replacement. Its accomplishment lies in temporary fitness: Quality would require reasons to value the work after those advantages were taken away.

In my previous post about Incentivemaxxing, I described how platforms provide rewards for content creators who approach boundary lines. Creators who are looking to game the system adapt their content toward the point of maximum reward. YouTube has the same kind of curve but with a different boundary. On YouTube, the pressure is toward premises, packaging, and pacing that improve click-through and retention for advertisers.

MrBeast did not invent this orientation. YouTube had already institutionalized it.

In March 2011, YouTube acquired Next New Networks, a web-video company that had developed, packaged, and built audiences by standardizing preexisting creator content into a one-size-fits-all product. YouTube called the resulting program YouTube Next, a creator-development unit that trained producers on how to accommodate the algorithm, an effort YouTube described as a strategy to compete against other platforms in the marketplace.

Shortly after acquisition, the Next New Network group published the first *Creator Playbook*, described as a collection of “best practices and strategies” for building audiences on the platform.

Simply put, the Playbook converted distribution into production doctrine. Programming, openings, release schedules, and audience interaction became variables YouTubers were told to incorporate to compete. The platform was no longer just distributing videos; it began prescribing how videos should be made for its own system.

The first substantive lesson concerned the opening fifteen seconds. Creators were told to consult attention graphs, locate early drop-offs, experiment with different “hooks,” and keep changing the opening until abandonment fell. Another section advised calls to action because likes, favorites, and shares improve a video’s ranking in the algorithm.

In February 2012, the same month Donaldson started his channel, YouTube released the Playbook’s second edition. It expanded the framework with instructions for organizing videos around different audiences, programming channels for the homepage feed, and optimizing creative work for global viewers. It also treated Analytics as actionable intelligence: creators should assess performance, investigate trends, measure optimizations, and alter their content or strategy in response. 

YouTube pushed this hard for years, so a MrBeast was bound to happen. MrBeast is merely the embodiment of the Playbook’s system in which popularity has replaced quality as the standard of judgment.

Now MrBeast says he can make almost anything go viral. The more interesting fact is what virality has made out of him. It has trained his eye, organized his time, shaped his company, selected his ideas, and given production decisions a number for the sake of making himself more popular. He uses YouTube to spread his videos, and YouTube uses him to reproduce the kinds of videos it rewards.

The formula is not applied to the content. The formula produces the content.

That is Incentivemaxxing to the max. It is also what it means to say that we do not simply use memes. Memes use us.

+

The Algorithmic Incentive Curve

When all hell broke loose on Facebook during the Cambridge Analytica era, people were focused largely on privacy, but equally important was the realization of its recommendation algorithms.

Facebook set policy on what was considered to be too violent, too sexual, and too everything else, and then moderated and removed based on whether or not content crossed the policy line. But as people got closer to the line, their content was shared more, and thus, they were more rewarded, leading to a platform full of the most extreme content allowed, where the most rewarded content sat right next to the boundary line.

One of the main reasons twitter, around that same era in the twenty-teens, was safer and more trusted, was because of how they managed, algorithmically, this approach to the policy line. Twitter explicitly acknowledged that some behavior did not violate the rules but still harmed conversations, and that instead of removing it, Twitter reduced its visibility. Essentially, they flipped the curve.

As content approached the prohibited boundary line, twitter demamplified it, removed it from recommendations, restricted its appearance in search, and used other methods of reducing incentive to spread. 

This all being then, it’s quite interesting because of where we are now. Have you seen what’s on twitter these days? The policy line has been shifted way to the right and the most extreme content gets the most rewarded.

In addition to the extensive pornography and graphic war violence, twenty-eight-year-old Dalton Eatherly, known as Chud the Builder, is a quintessential 2026 example of how the platform changed under Elon Musk.

Eatherly used the platform to become nationally known by livestreaming himself walking through towns in the Deep South, directing extreme racial slurs at random strangers before challenging them to “do something” that would justify him defending himself, including with the gun he carried. The slurs were so outrageous and disgusting they were literally jaw-dropping.

People shared the videos largely in disbelief that someone could openly do this. Eatherly claimed he was exercising free speech, and Musk’s platform did not moderate the content, showing that it fell within acceptable policy boundaries. The more controversial and extreme Easterly became, the more he was rewarded. I watched in disbelief, convinced he was eventually going to kill someone or be killed. It was clear he sought confrontations and deliberately provoked people because the platform rewarded that behavior.

Eatherly eventually did shoot someone during one of these filmed confrontations and is now in jail facing attempted murder. Even afterward, the content remained on the platform, and Eatherly raised more than $100,000 from supporters for his legal defense.

Unfiltered discussions and videos of street confrontations, assaults, war and even killings are surprisingly abundant on Musk’s platform. As for the cultural impact, of course it provokes outrage, anger, and engagement, ultimately feeding money back into the platform.

Every boundary creates an incentive gradient. The platform determines one boundary, the law establishes another, and creators adapt their behavior toward whichever boundary yields maximum reward. Incentivemaxing. This is the era we are in now.

+

A is for Artist: The First A Corp

Today in Boulder at the municipal building on Broadway and Arapahoe, I met Yancey Strickler (co-founder of Kickstarter) after hearing his talk on a new business designation that went into law in Colorado called an A Corp. This is similar to an LLC designation, but it’s geared toward supporting artists. The plan of action was conceived by Yancey just two years ago and is already law in Colorado, the first state in the U.S. to adopt it. As an interesting aside, it could have been possible to register a business in Colorado as an A Corp today, but it may take the state up to eight months before it can push out the one new column required in the official database…hopefully it will be ready in the spring of 2027. Generally, LLCs and other business entities that are founded now, or were already established, may switch to an A Corp when it becomes available.

Yancy Strickler in Boulder, July 1, 2026

What’s so cool is that it offers artists a simple template for starting up, especially when there is more than a single artist involved. If a group, like a music group, gallery owners, or people who share ownership in an artistic business, come together to share in the intellectual property, assets, investment, etc., the format offers an easy way to set it all up, designed to maximize value in the market while protecting the individual people and their artistic contributions. In a similar way that a B Corp offers a legal method to put one’s fiduciary responsibility to a social-good mission over a duty to enrich shareholders, an A Corp provides a way to define a business in terms of an artistic mission.

As Yancey and the others at the introduction were saying, the new A Corp doesn’t offer anything new that couldn’t be created with an LLC. You can have an artistic mission in an LLC and structure it all exactly the same as an A Corp without being an A Corp. This is basically a template for doing it, but there is somewhere to go next: Being recognized clearly in the market as a legitimate business. Specialized support services are destined to spring up now in Colorado. Lawyers will learn about the A Corp and begin providing expert services for artists to get setup for less of an expense. Insurance companies are likely to offer health plan rates for working artists with A Corps. Tax accountants will learn how to provide more value for artists based on the assets they are contributing to and building for the company. Shared resources will make marketplaces more efficient and cost effective. It’s a brilliant plan because it legitimizes artists in the workplace. The world will do more to see the value of the work artists do, and that the value is real, in terms of a legitimate economy for the state. Colorado is first.

From L to R: Yancy Strickler – Artist Corporations, Dave Ratner – Creative Law Network, Meredith Badler – Colorado Business Committee for The Arts (CBCA), Lauren Click – City of Boulder Office of Arts and Culture

You have likely heard about how cities and states can transform by supporting various industries. Austin, for example, transformed by offering tech companies and film companies tax incentives and lucrative contracts to move in. An interesting point that was made today along these lines: Colorado wants to be the place for the creative arts, and a recent investment into Sundance offers some evidence. In fact, the director of Sundance, Eugene Hernandez, played one of the many critical roles in the story that brings Yancy to Colorado first, the two having met to discuss exactly this important support that makes Colorado unique. Jared Polis, who don’t forget was a founder of Techstars which was inspired to platform startups, signed the bill into law last month. [The full story of how the A Corp came to be]

Check out, keep your eye on, and get in contact with the arts and business leaders pictured above (Meredith Badler became one of “A-Corp’s most influential champions in Colorado”) to plug in or help bring this plan to fruition wherever in the world you are. See Artist Corporations for the latest progress. To register, you can learn about the details, get your paperwork in order, and be ready by following the ten steps at https://www.artistcorporations.com/register.

Flashback to 15 years ago, here was Rocketboom’s Ella Morton on the pulse when Kickstarter was just coming out. You can see the trajectory from the thread in the works, years of dedication to platforming artists.

+

Om Malik, 1966-2026

One of the times we met, we were at a restaurant with Salman Rushdie. We sat on either side. The room was small and dark, and kinda cramped. Rushdie was freaked out and paranoid, constantly looking around as if he was being stalked, possibly killed at any minute. We were both excited to meet him, but the meeting didn’t last long; once his wife arrived, Rushdie was out of there pretty quickly. I remember this moment afterwards where Om and I looked at each with a big smile and raised eyebrows in sorta of a mutual, unspoken sigh of relief that we weren’t going to end up as collateral damage.

Om Malik was one of the very first influential bloggers. Day-to-day he led packs of others on Blogdex and Technorati, and then Techmeme, due to authority he earned with his style and the truth. Om represented Web 2.0, an era of organic, authentic information spread, before the silos emerged and the algorithms became corrupt. In the same way the founders of America built a constitutional framework, Om was one of a small group of founders of blogging, setting standards for a new style of independent, personal news publishing on the internet. It was the era that text became truly democratized, circa 2001, the year the internet in America made its way into 50% of American homes, that same year Om began writing GigaOm. Enter into his work here.

+

CCPA 2025CV11

For this media accountability action, after years of investigation, I filed a consumer protection complaint under the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (CCPA) against Alden Global Capital and its two controlling partners, Randall Smith and Heath Freeman individually, in Colorado District Court. I filed the case pro se, with the assistance of artificial intelligence.

It’s not as if I decided to use ChatGPT to represent myself in a murder trial, I took hold of the tools available to me to stand up as a consumer and individual citizen on behalf of all people in Colorado, with a message for all states, to say enough is enough with the Alden Global Capital mass media deception. These two men, Smith and Freeman, unwilling to show themselves in public or come to the table to be held accountable, are ruining journalism in America on a large scale and thus effecting democracy in a massive way. Having consolidated local news companies into the second largest newspaper conglomerate in the country, they are harming the world by misrepresenting their personal interferences into the world of American journalism, including forcing editorial and operational decisions that they promise the world they are not doing. 

Legally, via the CCPA, I’m asking the court to recognize that Smith and Freeman are knowingly engaged in what the courts aptly call “deceptive business trade practices”. Their product as a news service is falsely represented to consumers as being independent and governed by published journalistic standards which they know are not followed. Here in Colorado, the evidence shows that Smith and Freeman, acting as Alden board members, have taken formal board member votes to micro-manage the Denver Post’s editorial and policy decisions, even as the newspaper’s own Terms of Service claim that ownership plays no role in editorial control. The evidence in the case includes once private letters between Freeman and members of the Senate, documented interferences by Alden’s hidden editorial demands, and documentation from Denver Post representatives who admitted that they are no longer capable of following their own journalistic promises. The facts detail how Smith and Freeman’s board rejected the Denver Posts requests to update their editorial promises to the public. If the Denver Post updated their terms to reflect their true, diminished capabilities and true ownership control over operations and editorial, it would rightfully cause the general public to lose trust in their products and services and thus, harm the revenue Alden makes from subscription and advertising sales. A company can not have a terms of service and sell a product based on their promises to uphold those terms while knowing that they do not actually abide by those terms. In consumer law, this is known as “deception”, a form of business fraud.

Why should I personally have a standing to bring this claim? I had already been investigating Alden and understood that they engage in consumer fraud through the editor’s alignment with Alden’s mission, but I did not know this same deceptive practice applied to my own situation. I assumed the chief editor had at least formed an editorial opinion about the Osher series, even if it was a bad one. In mid-2024, new email correspondence revealed for the first time that she had never reviewed the series at all and therefore had never formed any editorial judgment. She initially claimed she had reviewed the articles and found nothing to change, but when pressed, she inadvertently admitted she had never edited or even evaluated them; and when I then asked her to conduct a review, she refused. This was the first moment I could have known that my harm did not result from an editorial opinion but from a deceptive practice: knowingly not following the newspaper’s promised standards while attempting to conceal that fact. That discovery is what gives me standing under the CCPA.

By applying the CCPA, I’m seeking injunctive relief, asking the court to require Smith and Freeman to either remove or revise the Denver Post’s Terms of Service which I show Alden controls, so that the terms accurately reflect the company’s actual operations. The current terms promise a high caliber of ethical journalism with promises their news companies will comply with specific, laid-out editorial and ethical standards that, in practice, are knowingly no longer followed, as I also show in detail with facts throughout my complaint. 

Having explicated and poured over other complaints filed under the CCPA, I believe it’s the correct path to hold Alden Global Capital accountable for their deceptive business practices, and in particular, though rare, holding the actual individuals in control to account, which the CCPA allows for. When executives engage in consumer fraud on behalf of their companies, they expose themselves to personal, civil liabilities under this act and can be held personally liable. Just as a business cannot put up a terms of service to pretend they follow those terms while knowing they do not, a trusted journalistic institution serving democracy by reporting on public matters cannot be structured so that it knowingly abandons its own journalistic standards while intentionally withholding this fact from the public in order to preserve consumer trust and financial value. 

HOW I’VE USED AI

The District Court in Boulder has so far been accepting of my use of A.I. At a hearing, I explained that I felt out of place in such a forum, wished I had the wherewithal to afford experienced representation for such a large case, and voluntarily offered to go into detail about my use of A.I. The judge was interested to hear about it so I elaborated. As far as I know, I am the first person to file a case in the district court in Colorado pro se using AI tools while openly disclosing my use and method.

To provide an explanation to the judge for how I’ve been using Chat GPT,  I asked it to provide an overview of my use which I included in my filings (ChatGPT Archive Link):

You have to use flattery these days as a warning to double-check your work. I was already familiar with ChatGPT and had been using it extensively to code, working within the codebases I already know well, particularly PHP which is good for building on the internet, and how I’ve built most of my works. When writing or debugging code, there’s a point where the boundaries of a codebase become clear; there are only so many valid functions, parameters, and logical paths available. That realization helped me understand why ChatGPT performs so effectively with programming: code is structured, finite, and rule-based.

When I began studying the CCPA, the rules of civil procedure for the court Im in, and began reading through other CCPA pleadings from complaint to case end, I noticed that law functions much like a codeset. It consists of defined inputs and outputs including statutory provisions, case precedents, procedural rules, and outcomes that depend on how the pieces can interact most effectively to get to the desired end. Seeing law through that lens made it natural to use ChatGPT not only for research but as an analytical tool. The system can integrate the full text of statutes, rules, and judicial history, then translate that structure into plain language, legal argumentation, or narrative form. In the same way that it can act as a capable co-developer within a software environment, ChatGPT can also function as a kind of legal interpreter, able to parse a complex procedural framework and render it accessible to different audiences, whether lay readers, or lawyers.

CONTEXT FOR MY USE OF AI

A couple of months ago, I attended a talk on AI, Law and Entrepreneurship hosted by the Rocky Mountain AI Interest Group (RMAIIG) at the University of Colorado Boulder. The event struck a deep chord with me because it helped me see my own work in this case through a broader frame, less as an uncharted endeavor I’ve taken on myself, and more as part of a larger shift in how artificial intelligence is beginning to bridge the gap between law and accessibility.

The first lecture featured Harry Surden, Professor of Law at the University of Colorado, Faculty Director of the Silicon Flatirons Center AI Initiative, and Associate Director of Stanford University’s CodeX Center for Legal Informatics.

Surden, who has been studying AI in law for nearly two decades, went through justifying AI’s recent breakthroughs by benchmarks for the various LLM models and broke the question down neatly into what he called simple versus hard cases. In simple cases where the law is clear, precedent consistent, and outcomes predictable (e.g. a general tennant/landlord lease might regularly fall into this category), AI is “really good” now according to Surden. But in hard cases, those with conflicting precedents, factual ambiguity, or high error cost, human legal judgment is still essential. For now.

Slide from Surden's lecture

The second lecture was by Jason Lynch, General Counsel and COO at Foundry Group, Boulderite Brad Feld’s venture-capital firm. Feld, together with David Cohen and now-Governor Jared Polis, co-founded Techstars. Lynch’s presentation took the AI-can-do-law logic to its edge. In his talk provocatively titled “AI Lawyers Should Be Admitted to the Bar,” he argued that AI can already perform nearly all the core functions of an attorney counseling, advising, drafting pleadings, and preparing filings. He noted that AI passes the bar and might in some cases outperform a newly minted lawyer who has just passed the bar.

Both Surden and Lynch appeared driven by the positive effects A.I. may have on what they both consider to be an access to justice crisis in America: 80 percent of civil legal needs in the U.S. go unmet.  40 percent of counties in the US have fewer than one lawyer per 1,000 residents, and where lawyers are available, they are often cost prohibitive.

Slide from Surden's lecture

Despite my own confidence in my claims which is not a confidence I obtained from AI but from access and time to understand the CCPA and other cases that have been tried under the act, the odds are completely against me. According to general studies of civil litigation, when a plaintiff proceeds pro se against well-resourced defendants with experienced representation, the chances of the plaintiff succeeding are in the range of 2-3%. While AI may help to change that rate in the future, my case in particular is especially difficult and complex, and the defendants have already proven to not play fair. My case would sit on the far edge of the ”hard cases” chart for a pro se litigant attempting to use AI. It’s practically a miracle that I’ve remained standing this long. While I may not win the war due to my lack of experience in this forum, I have won many battles already that act as stepping stones for the next person who becomes caught in the crosshairs of Alden’s bad faith business practices and is willing to stand up to such a large and ruthless, unaccountable power.

Accomplishments so far:

  • Demonstrated that Alden’s attorneys, Steven Zansberg and Mike Beylkin, who represent Alden Global Capital, Heath Freeman and Randall Smith personally, are not litigating in good faith. They have employed what’s called judicial estoppel, which is a serious issue, asserting one set of facts as true when convenient and then later asserting the opposite set of facts as true when strategically useful. This conduct matters beyond my case: these same attorneys represent The Denver Post, so these tactics reflect how the newspaper itself attempts to win disputes in the community without ever engaging honestly. Their pattern includes, along with the editor, refusing to articulate an editorial position, refusing to participate in the editing process, falsely asserting that editing occurred and then inadvertently revealing that it never did, later asserting that it never would, refusing to confer unless compelled by the court, refusing all discovery, and using avoidance and estoppel as a strategy to win through a gross disregard for truth and honesty.
  • Established that Freeman and Smith, in their own defensive pleadings became parties to the case individually by voluntarily adopting and incorporating the arguments of their corporate entities, thereby placing themselves within the litigation in their personal capacities, de facto. If there was ever uncertainty about their individual liability, their own pleadings resolved it: they have become rightful defendants to the claims for business fraud in this case.  Combined with the documented facts showing Alden’s direct control over newsroom editorial and operations, this provides a template for other plaintiffs in Colorado and other states whose local Alden-owned newspapers engage in consumer deception, to consider suing Smith and Freeman individually, for having personally admitted the same facts and promises that their corporate entries admitted to.
  • Shortly after my complaint was filed, Lee Ann Colacioppo, the chief editor of The Denver Post, who has been accommodating Smith and Freeman since Gregory Moore resigned over Alden’s interference, announced she is winding down her career. Throughout her tenure, she chose loyalty to Alden over service to the community by helping to conceal Alden’s role and by abandoning basic journalistic standards. Her own disregard for truth and her deceptive attempt to conceal that she never edited was an important contributor to the very conditions that now expose Freeman and Smith to claims of consumer fraud.
  • Clarified in the pleadings that Alden’s attorneys have deliberately avoided the truth as a litigation strategy. In a notice to the court reserving my right to seek sanctions, I filed the complete correspondence between myself and Alden’s lawyers, which shows a pattern of bullying, refusal to engage in or permit discovery, and a willingness to obscure facts through bad-faith tactics. This behavior mirrors Alden’s broader institutional pattern toward its newspapers and the public. Any future claimant against an Alden-controlled entity should consider reading the full set of filings to see how they treat people. Be aware that these attorneys threaten filings without justification, but just because they can, even before reviewing what they would be opposing. The record speaks for itself: The Denver Post and Alden’s lawyers, who sometimes champion First Amendment causes in Colorado when it suits them, are playing both sides of the coin, using estoppel, factual avoidance, intimidation and threats to defend Smith and Freeman’s deceptive business practices.

I. Filing and Initial Proceedings (January – April 2025)

January 2025:

  • I filed the original complaint in Boulder County District Court (Case No. 2025-CV-11) against Alden Global Capital, Heath Freeman, and Randall Smith as the only three defendants.
  • My claims were brought primarily under the Colorado Consumer Protection Act, with related theories including fraudulent concealment, misrepresentation, and injunctive relief.
  • The case emphasized that the deceptive conduct was related to the terms of service and thus commercial, not editorial.

February–March 2025:

  • The defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion under C.R.S. § 13-20-1101, arguing that my claims arose from protected journalistic speech.
  • I responded that (1) the claims target commercial misrepresentation, not speech; (2) the motion was untimely; and (3) even if the statute applied, I could meet Step Two with extensive factual evidence of falsity and deception.
  • Before the hearing, I filed an amended complaint, which procedurally mooted the first anti-SLAPP motion.

Originally, I sued only the three individuals — Alden, Freeman, and Smith. The defense then argued that the entities actually responsible would be MediaNews Group, The Denver Post, and Prairie Mountain Media. I amended the complaint to include those parties, and the owners subsequently adopted the defenses of those entities, effectively making themselves de facto parties. This is a rare occurrence in corporate litigation, as it placed the principals themselves directly on the hook….which it should do.

II. Renewed Anti-SLAPP and Consolidated Opposition (April – June 2025)

April 2025:

  • The defendants filed a renewed anti-SLAPP motion, recycling the same arguments.
  • I filed a motion to strike the renewed filing as untimely under § 13-20-1101(5) and as procedurally abusive, while also submitting a full Step Two opposition on the merits.
  • There was a missed opportunity on my part to help establish the correct precedent in Colorado on the fair timing for the use of an Anti-SLAPP, which is extremely dangerous for a plaintiff because it practically demands a mini-trial to get past it. I quickly learned through this process that the anti-SLAPP, while positive for companies that practice journalism sincerely, can be abused by companies like Alden where they use it to defend themselves against claims that are unrelated to defamation or first amendment speech, for example this commercial claim about following their terms of service. Under the rules, a plaintiff may file one amended complaint as a matter of right so long as the defendants have not yet filed an answer, and an anti-SLAPP motion is not considered an answer for this purpose. By the time the defendants filed their second anti-SLAPP motion, the deadline for doing so had already expired. The judge had the authority to decide the issue, but no Colorado court has ever ruled on this precise question of timing, and the judge in my case did not reach it either. I missed an opportunity to be more forceful in showing that if the defendants wanted to prevent my amended complaint from mooting their first anti-SLAPP motion, which prevents the risk of needing to file a second one too late, they needed to file an answer rather than relying solely on successive anti-SLAPP motions.
  • My consolidated brief relied on Rhino Fund, Harte-Hanks, Newport Harbor Ventures, and complaints filed by the state of Colorado to illustrate the distinction between commercial deception and protected speech, and to show how, so long as the defendants misrepresent their product to consumers, every day is another day that they continue to engage in bad business practices.
  • I attached extensive evidentiary exhibits, including:
    • documented factual inaccuracies; ethical breaches, and an extended set of examples of ongoing breaches;
    • the 2024 Colacioppo email which revealed the fraudulent concealment;
    • correspondence showing institutional refusal to review corrections; and
    • examples of misleading “corrections policy” and “Trust Project” representations.

During this stage, the defense invoked judicial estoppel and other procedural tactics while refusing to produce any discovery. In response, I filed all correspondence between myself, and the defendants lawyers into the public record to ensure full transparency. The record now includes a complete set of communications showing repeated avoidance of factual engagement.

To be clear, the defense has not only refused to provide any discovery, they have refused to accept any discovery. After asking them to let me know what discovery they would like to see, they went as far as to warn me not to send them any discovery.

III. District Court Order (June 20 – August 13, 2025)

June 20, 2025:

  • The District Court dismissed the business entities including those Smith and Freeman alleged would be responsible instead of them, holding only that my claims were time-barred, while, importantly, dismissing Smith and Freeman without prejudice. Without prejudice means I’m free to try again, which I will do if needed after the ruling on appeal.

VI. Rule 59(e) Motion and Arguments (July 2025)

  • My Rule 59(e) motion argued that the court had misapplied the statute of limitations by disregarding:
    1. The 2024 Colacioppo email as a new deceptive act restarting the limitations period under § 6-1-115.
    2. Continuing fraudulent concealment by Alden and its representatives.
    3. The ongoing pattern of deceptive trade practices distinct from defamation.
  •  
  • The motion consolidated the CCPA claims into two parts:
    1. Part I: New and independent deceptive acts — the 2024 email and a 2025 defense-counsel statement that further misrepresented the facts.
    2. Part II: Ongoing institutional deception based on the false representation of correction and ethical-review policies.
  •  
  • August 13, 2025: The court issued its final order, denying my Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment.
  • The ruling triggered the appellate deadlines and now serves as the anchor date for all appeal-related filings.

V. Appeal and Next Steps (September – November 2025)

October 1, 2025:

  • I filed a Notice of Appeal to the Colorado Court of Appeals in Denver.
  • Transcripts from the hearing were ordered, and I began preparing my arguments for the appeal. I’m not appealing just because I can, I do believe that fraudulent concealment was argued for correctly. If the appeal court finds I did not argue it correctly or that it was too late to be elaborated on from within the 59e rule then I will be sure and use that knowledge when adapting my new complaint which I will file.
The appeal was filed, answer and reply have been completed,  and so next the Colorado Court of Appeals will issue a decision.
 

Links (*Im still filling out links to filings. These can be accessed by searching the case number, 2025CV11 in the Colorado Court’s E-filing system for lawyers, or via Lexis Nexis for others at https://cocourts.com ). If you are engaged in research and would like a copy of a particular filing, please reach out.

Links to information, prior to filings:

  1. On Humanwire (March, 2022) – Facts on the organization, misreporting and what occurred as a result of the misreporting. https://dembot.net/on-humanwire/
  2. Personal entry related to the lack of accountability by The Denver Post (January, 2023) https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1A9yiptkuS/?mibextid=wwXIfr
  3. Full investigation into The Denver Post and The Daily Camera’s operations under Alden (January, 2025) https://dembot.net/colorado-journalism-culture-shift/

Links to filings:

+ The First Complaint: Best to understand how Smith and Freeman operate Alden and their subsidiaries including MediaNew Group and The Denver Post, and how I claim they are engaged in ongoing consumer fraud. https://dembot.net/baron-v-alden-global-capital-randall-smith-and-heath-freeman/

+ The Amended Complaint: Best to understand the facts surrounding Christoper Osher’s extensive, extremely rare journalistic fraud (starts with Paragraph 11 on the PDF). https://dembot.net/amended-complaint/

+ Notice to court on the disregard for truth by defendants and their counsel. This included the full email correspondence between myself Alden’s lawyers [link forthcoming]

+ List of ALL filings prior to appeal: https://dembot.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/2025CV11-list-of-filings.pdf

CURRENT STATUS: The case was dismissed without prejudice as to the individual defendants, Randall Smith and Heath Freeman, meaning I am able to “try again”, which I will do, if needed. First, the case is before the Colorado Court of Appeals regarding the dismissal. If the appeal is unsuccessful with a decision I disagree with, I will use what I have learned to file a new, “better” complaint against Smith and Freeman. To date, the only substantive ruling the district court has made, which was the reason for dismissal, concerns the statute-of-limitations timeline. The District Court held that my CCPA claims expired in 2021, three years after what it viewed as the last deceptive act in a series. I appealed instead of immediately refiling because The Court did not properly address my argument that the statute of limitations was reset in 2024, when The Denver Post’s Editor-in-Chief made a new deceptive representation that constitutes fraudulent concealment under Colorado law. That 2024 act extended the limitations period to mid-2027. I also provided an array of other facts that should justify extending, reseting and starting the clock anew. I believe my January 2025 filing was therefore, timely. Even more simply, I argued a case should not be tossed on a statue-of -imitations grounds, at the pleadings stage, on a motion to dismiss. A decision from the Court of Appeals could come by the late summer or fall of 2026. If the decision is in my favor, the case will resume where it left off, and if the decision is not in my favor, and if I disagree, then I will take what I learned and try again.